When and How did We Come to the Current 14 CFR § 91.17 Regulations?

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What’s wrong with this picture?

Technically, until well into the 1960s, nothing. The pilot just didn’t have to be “under the influence” of alcohol to not fly.

Glad we made some changes.

But it got me curious, when did this really become more regulated?

If you are reading this, and curious about when regulations about alcohol usage and flying were put in place like I was, well, keep reading.

Here is what I was able to find on the topic.

Most of us know 14 CFR § 91.17 establishes prohibitions on alcohol and drug use for crewmembers of civil aircraft, including pilots. The regulation has evolved over time through amendments to address emerging safety concerns, technological advancements in testing, and alignment with broader Department of Transportation (DOT) policies. But getting to that point was a mix of changes in FAR history, Federal Register notices, and related FAA guidance.

But, I was curious when it actually became a regulation that pilots had to wait 8 hours from consuming alcohol before they could fly an aircraft.

When I did some digging, I was surprised at how late into flying activities that we actually waited to make it a “rule.”

It wasn’t until 1970 that the 8-hour rule became a formal regulation through Amendment 91-75, published in the Federal Register (35 FR 7390, May 13, 1970) and effective June 12, 1970.

But how did we get there, and where have we gone since then?

Pre-1970: Origins in “Under the Influence” Prohibitions

The roots of the regulation trace back to the Civil Air Regulations (CAR), which predated the modern Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). These were consolidated into 14 CFR Part 91 in the early 1960s following the creation of the FAA in 1958.

In the initial codification of Part 91 (effective January 1, 1963, via Federal Register Vol. 27, No. 219, November 13, 1962), the rule appeared as § 91.11 “Liquor and drugs.” It prohibited:

“Acting as a crewmember while “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” or using any drug that affects faculties contrary to safety. or;

Allowing an obviously intoxicated person (or under drugs, except medical patients) to be carried aboard, unless in an emergency.”

There was no specific time-based restriction like the 8-hour rule; enforcement relied on subjective assessments of impairment. In otherwords, if the co-pilot wanted to “let the captain sleep it off on the first leg,” that might get by in those days. Yes, according to some of the old pilots I have talked with, that happened for real. At point in history,  a focus was on general safety without quantifiable limits.

By the mid-1960s, growing awareness of alcohol’s impact on aviation safety led to educational efforts. In 1966, the FAA suggested an 8-hour waiting period in advisory materials (e.g., pamphlets and safety bulletins) as a best practice, but it was not yet regulatory. This “suggestion” stemmed from studies on alcohol metabolism and pilot performance, though the exact foundation was described as somewhat arbitrary in later analyses (e.g., focusing on time elapsed rather than individual factors like amount consumed or sleep).

 1970: Introduction of the 8-Hour Rule (Amendment 91-75)

The 8-hour rule became a formal regulation through Amendment 91-75, published in the Federal Register (35 FR 7390, May 13, 1970) and effective June 12, 1970.

This amendment revised § 91.11(a) to explicitly prohibit acting as a crewmember:

“(1) Within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic beverage.”

It retained the “under the influence” and drug prohibitions.

The FAA cited increasing evidence from accident investigations and studies showing alcohol’s lingering effects on judgment, coordination, and reaction time, even after apparent sobriety. The rule aimed to provide a clear, enforceable buffer to prevent impairment. It applied to all civil aircraft operations under Part 91, including pilots.

This marked the first quantifiable time restriction, shifting from purely subjective (“under the influence”) to objective criteria. The FAA noted that while 8 hours was a minimum, pilots should consider hangover effects and allow more time if needed (e.g., 12-24 hours for heavier consumption).

1980s: Addition of Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) Limits and Testing

In the 1980s, the regulation was strengthened amid broader DOT efforts to combat substance abuse in transportation.

Amendment 91-199 (50 FR 15328, April 17, 1985; effective May 17, 1985) added a BAC limit:

“Prohibited acting as a crewmember with “0.04 percent by weight or more alcohol in the blood.”

This was half the typical U.S. driving limit (0.08-0.10 at the time) to provide an extra safety margin for aviation. It aligned with DOT standards for commercial operations and reflected resistance from earlier decades, where some argued alcohol-related accidents were rare.

The rule also authorized law enforcement to request blood tests from crewmembers involved in accidents or suspected violations, with results reportable to the FAA.

In 1989, as part of a broader recodification of Part 91 (Amendment 91-211, 54 FR 34284, August 18, 1989; effective August 18, 1989), the section was renumbered from § 91.11 to § 91.17 without substantive changes.

1990s: Alignment with Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act

The Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 mandated drug and alcohol testing programs for safety-sensitive transportation workers, including pilots in commercial operations (Parts 121 and 135).

Amendment 91-252 (59 FR 7380, February 15, 1994; effective March 17, 1994) integrated these requirements into § 91.17, requiring pilots to submit to tests by law enforcement or the FAA if reasonable suspicion existed. It also clarified that violations could lead to certificate revocation.

This era emphasized random, post-accident, and reasonable-suspicion testing, though Part 91 general aviation pilots were not subject to routine random testing unless in commercial roles.

2000s: Breath Testing and Disqualification Provisions

In 2004, amendment 91-278 (69 FR 74802, December 14, 2004; effective January 13, 2005) updated § 91.17 to recognize breath alcohol testing alongside blood tests, reflecting technological advancements. It set the BAC violation at 0.04 or greater in breath (grams of alcohol per 210 liters).

Amendment 91-287 (71 FR 35758, June 21, 2006; effective July 21, 2006) further revised the rule for consistency with disqualification standards, emphasizing that a BAC of 0.04+ or refusal to test could lead to medical certificate denial or revocation under Part 67.

Post-2010: Minor Updates and Ongoing Guidance

No major substantive changes have taken place since 2006, but the FAA has issued advisory circulars (e.g., AC 120-33) and brochures emphasizing the rule’s limitations. For example, the FAA notes that 8 hours is a minimum—hangover effects can persist longer, and pilots should aim for 12-24 hours.

In 2018, the FAA Reauthorization Act reinforced testing but did not alter § 91.17 directly.

Current text of the Federal Aviation Regulations retains the 8-hour rule, 0.04 BAC limit (blood or breath), drug prohibitions, and keeps passenger restrictions for those who appear to be under the influence of alcohol. And there is little doubt that this is going away anytime soon, but it is curious how we got to the current regulations that most of us know well and just assume have always been there.

It hasn’t, and it actually took a while to fully develop into the regulations we all learn in our initial pilot training now.

The regulation’s evolution reflects a shift from qualitative to quantitative standards, improving enforceability and safety.

In a timely update, the FAA also just released InFO 26002 on January 13th on the topic of Impaired or Intoxicated Passengers Aboard Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 91 or Part 135 flights. You can find it by clicking here. Pilots and their alcohol habits are the only concern that pilots might have to consider in their flight operations.

To the CFIs: Engage with Your Students Weather Decisions for Checkride Day for Success and Safety

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As Certified Flight Instructors (CFIs), we wear many hats: teacher, mentor, evaluator, and sometimes even psychologist. Our primary mission is to shape safe, competent pilots who can handle the skies with confidence and sound judgment. 

This extends to checkride day, where just preparing our students may not be enough. In some rare cases, and as an indicator that the student really might not be as ready as you might have thought, you may have to step in to stop them from proceeding with the scheduled event for the likelihood of their success, or worse, their safety.

The “Desire to Get It Done”: How Eagerness Clouds Judgment

The infamous “desire to get it done”is a psychological trap every pilot falls into at some point, but students are particularly vulnerable. After months of training, the checkride looms as the gateway to freedom—solo cross-countries, carrying passengers, or advancing to the next rating. This eagerness can distort risk assessment.

Psychologically, it’s rooted in confirmation bias: Students fixate on favorable forecast elements (e.g., “The TAF shows improvement by noon”) while downplaying negatives (e.g., “But there’s a SIGMET for turbulence”). Loss aversion plays in too—they’d rather risk a marginal day than “lose” the slot and wait weeks for another.

Real-world examples abound. I recall a student who insisted on a private pilot checkride despite gusty winds forecasted at 25-30 knots. “I’ve practiced in worse,” he said. But during the test, a wind shear forced a very rough landing, and I had to step in as the DPE to save it. No, this isn’t a pass.

The question could be asked here: Did the student fail the maneuver? Or did they really fail well ahead of that moment when they decided to fly in weather conditions that were outside their personal minimums and beyond their realistic ability to safely perform the required maneuvers for the practical test in the conditions that existed that day?

Had the CFI been more engaged, they could have vetoed the student’s plan to proceed with the test, no matter what that day.

We try to teach personal minimums, and hope our students have learned them, but sometimes the pressures of the moment override their decision-making talents.

Encourage students to set conservative weather criteria early—say, no checkrides with winds over 20 knots or 15 knots of crosswinds, perhaps, or ceilings below 4,000 feet (depending on the maneuvers required for the practical test. Review these during engagement sessions and adjust based on experience. 

Doing this ahead of time means the students will have some parameters to apply on checkride day, making them more likely to stay within them.

Knowing the Plan: Why CFIs Must Track Practical Test Schedules

One of the most overlooked aspects of CFI responsibilities is monitoring when students intend to take their practical tests. The FAA requires us to endorse students for the checkride, but that endorsement doesn’t end our involvement. In fact, it’s just the beginning. You need to know the exact date, time, and location well in advance.

It is amazing how many times I have had CFIs not know when their students were actually taking a checkride and hadn’t spoken with their students the night before or the day of the scheduled test, if there were any questions about the weather for that day.

This gets even more important when the student will be travelling to a DPE at another airport, sometimes a bit of a way away. This adds layers of complexity: fuel planning, airspace navigation, and most critically, weather assessment. If you’re not aware of the plan, you can’t provide that final layer of oversight for your student.

Weather Decisions: More Than Just Passing the Test

Weather is the great equalizer in aviation. It doesn’t care about your logbook hours or enthusiasm; it demands respect. For practical tests, students must demonstrate proficiency in weather interpretation and decision-making, but ironically, their own checkride day can test this skill in real-time.

Remember, part of the test is their decision making abitliy. The choice of whether the weather conditions are good enough to do the test and complete all the required maneuvers.

In a worst-case scenario, a student makes a terrible weather decision before the test even begins, trying to fly through weather beyond their own or their aircraft’s capabilities. Hopefully not with a catastrophic outcome before the test even begins.

Safety extends beyond the test itself. If flying to the DPE, en route weather must be factored in. A 50-mile flight in VMC is fine, but add low-level wind shear or convective activity, and it becomes hazardous. Post-test, elation or disappointment can impair judgment—fatigue sets in, and a marginal return flight might seem acceptable.

The CFI as the Last Check Valve: Safeguarding Against Risks

In the chain of safety, you’re the final barrier. Students might not see the risks—they’re focused on the prize. But with your experience, you can identify red flags others miss.

Act as the check valve by:

  1. Requiring Pre-Test Reviews: Mandate a meeting 24-48 hours before the checkride to review weather, aircraft status, and personal readiness.
  2. Simulating Scenarios: Incorporate weather decision drills into lessons. Use apps to pull real forecasts and debate go/no-go calls.
  3. Encouraging Contingencies: Always plan for Plan B. Discuss alternate dates, ground transportation if weather sours, or potentially using alternate airports if weather is better at other locations.
  4. Documenting Discussions: Log these talks in the student’s record. It protects you legally and reinforces accountability.
  5. Postponing Without Judgment: Frame delays positively: “This ensures you’re at your best and safest.” Share stories of successful reschedules to normalize it.

Remember, FAR 61.43 requires practical tests under conditions conducive to safe flight. If you suspect otherwise, withhold or withdraw endorsement. It’s tough, but it’s our duty.

Why do I write this now, you may be asking?

Well, let’s go with story time from a recent practical test that was scheduled.

It started with a text from a fellow DPE who had the commercial single-engine initial test scheduled at an airport. When the weather was pretty rough.

That got me curious that morning. Was this applicant really going through with the test?

A quick look at the METARs should have told anyone logical that the test wasn’t going to go that day. Well, it shouldn’t, at least.

There were literally GALE warnings out on the Great Lakes, and the METARs were already showing the ramping up of the winds. And the declining ceilings.

The applicant had flown to the destination airport the night before when the weather was better. Unfortunately, he hadn’t bothered to take the time to really look at what the weather was going to do the next day or figure out how they might get home after a test in the forecasted conditions.

The DPE tried to be as helpful as possible. Hinting to the applicant, “Maybe today isn’t the best day to do this…” before they even started.

But the applicant persisted, saying it would be fine. Decision-making skills obviously already in question.

The ground portion didn’t last long, which was unsurprising given the decision-making skills already demonstrated. A disapproval was issued for multiple ACS-based deficiencies.

At this point, the DPE tried his best to convince the applicant to borrow the airport’s courtesy car, that they would help put the plane in a hangar to keep it out of the weather and warm, and to drive home, come back, and get the plane another day. The airport manager was in full agreement, and the team at the airport was trying to get the applicant to make a good decision and not try to fly home in the weather.

But, stubborn and bound to fly the mighty Cessna 150 home into whatever weather was ahead, he launched.

While the applicant was preflighting, the DPE tried to reach the CFI to see if a call from them might better influence the applicant. The CFI wasn’t available or responsive.

As DPEs, we can’t detain a person, we can’t “STOP” them from flying, we can try to influence as best we can. But the applicant wasn’t hearing any of it.

With the applicant launched, the other DPE called me, and we talked. Both of us were sincerely concerned for the applicant’s safety along his intended route of flight back to his home airport

The next two pictures show the radar he was headed toward, and the one showing it was not only super windy, but he was also headed into freezing rain with descending ceilings.

We honestly had the feeling that we were watching an accident chain unfold well into the making.

And then, the ADS-B track stopped.

We waited a bit, hoping it was that he had diverted to another airport, not fallen out of the sky short of any airport as he iced up the 150 in a determined effort to fly no matter what.

The good news is that the applicant did divert. He did land at another airport. He had made it only about 21 miles from one airport to another before even further ceilings forced him down, scud running to get in and saving himself from much worse conditions ahead.

The next few days were extremely windy and were followed by a major snowstorm in Michigan. I have no idea if the applicant was able to get the aircraft into a hangar at the airport he finally stopped ator not. All we know is he didn’t die that day. Thankfully.

Reading this, you all can probably see how this could have gone WAY worse. As an armchair quarterback we can say, “I would never do that,” or “My students would never have done that!” But we have to remain engaged with each other, and as CFIs, especially with our students as they feel the pressures of getting a checkride done.

This obviously applies to all of our flying, and the pressures we have to complete flights. But those skills need to be built at the base levels of training if we are going to effectively employ them later when we are flying on our own.

So, CFIs out there reading this, help us not let applicants get to DPEs with these major challenges so obviously present. If you are reading this as a student, think critically and make good decisions that won’t force your CFIs to have to be last check valve on your safety decisions.

Fellow CFIs, let’s recommit to deep engagement with our students. Know their practical test plans inside out, guide their weather decisions with wisdom, and counter the “desire to get it done” with reasoned caution. By doing so, we ensure they pass not just the test but emerge as safe aviators. The skies can be unforgiving, and sometimes as a CFI we have to be that lastcheck valve for our students.

CFI Signoff Frequency in 2025

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It’s the time of the year again where I start looking at pilot certification data from the previous year, this year looking back at 2025. One of those interesting points I always find intriguing is the data related to how many CFIs signed applicants off for practical tests.

Let’s start by looking at how many CFIs signed off even one applicant for a test in 2025.

The chart below shows the trend of this data point since 2017.

 

For the first time in a few years, this number actually decreased. It didn’t go down by much, staying mostly flat, but it wasn’t showing that more CFIs were actively engaged in signing applicants off for practical tests.

We expect that this may continue to be an indicator that CFIs are actively engaged in the training sector, but “turn over” as hiring at airlines hire them from those positions to mostly regional airline jobs.

As hiring was down some in 2025, this may have had an effect on the number of CFIs who “turned over” in their job positions and moved on to other employment as professional pilots.

It can also be an indicator that CFIs are turning over in their jobs and that more CFIs are signing people off for tests as they work to gain experience and then transition into other professional pilot jobs for which they become qualified based on the hours they gain as a CFI along the way.

An indicator that CFIs may have been staying in the job positions slightly longer this year is the data point that shows that more CFIs in 2025 signed off more than 5 applicants for practical tests in the previous years.

This increase isn’t overly large, only around a couple of hundred, but it is an indicator of stability in the tenure of CFIs in 2025.

Like most years, we still see an overall small number of our CFI population conducting the majority of sign-offs for applicants when it comes to qualifying forpractical tests.

The data here shows that 23,649 CFIs were engaged with signing applicants off for practical tests.

While other CFIs may be engaged with other activities such as flight reviews, IPCs, transition or endorsement-related training, those types of training are a smaller part of the pilot pipeline production pathway. While we have (probably – more data will be out on the 2025 numbers in the next month) more than 120,000 CFI certificate holders, many are of ages where they are no longer actively providing training, or, more commonly, hold CFI certificates and are actively flying professionally doing other pilot jobs and simply keeping their CFI certificates active so they don’t need to re-certify if their rececnecy of experience expires.

I always also like to include the breakdown levels we get on sign-offs in each year for those CFIs out there who wonder how they compare to others if they were highly active in their sign-off activity level in 2025.

So here it is.

The chart below shows how many CFIs signed off applicants in ranges. Kudos to that CFI who was busy enough to sign off more than 200 applicants for practical tests in 2025, I have to think it was someone working in a place where add-on certificates, such as seaplane, might have been the main business.

Even if you signed off more than the 5 students, required to renew your CFI certificate (with an appropriate pass rate), and especially if you had that 80% pass rate with more than 10 sign-offs in the preceding 24 months, or even the year, you find yourself in a smaller community of very active CFIs to accomplish that number of sign-offs.

And one more fun data point…if you were wondering. The overwhelming majority of CFI certificates issued each year are issued to U.S. citizens. While the United States remains a place that many foreign nations send their students to train, they do so through their commercial pilotcertifications and then head back to their home countries.

We find the following over the past couple of years when it comes to the percentages of CFI certificates issued to U.S. pilots.

ATP Certification Numbers Dip in 2025

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ATP certificate issuance decreased again in 2025, dropping further from the 2024 numbers and a high point in recent years in 2023.

As final certificate issuance numbers from 2025 come in, we see a total ATP AMEL certificates issued in 2025 coming in at 7593 certificates.

This is a decrease again from 2024 of 18.9% and a drop compared with our recent high point in 2023 by 31.5%.

This should not surprise us when we consider that we saw decreased airline hiring.

As airline hiring dipped in the past two years from higher points in the post-COVID years of 2022 and 2023, fewer pilots were hired into regional airlines. As that hiring tapered off in 2024 and 2025, pilots were not transitioning through initial training courses at regional airlines where they typically complete an ATP CTP course, a type rating, and their ATP (including R-ATP) certification.

While the 2025 numbers are a dip from high points, they still represent higher numbers of ATP certification happening than were experienced going backward from 2022 through nearly all of the years back to 2007.

We can see that in the following chart, where we see that the number of certificates issued still trends up on a yearly basis over the past nearly 20 years.

We continued to also see that the percentage of ATP certificates that are issued remains around the 30% range in the past few years. Dipping a little in 2025, this is still an indicator that about 30% of our pilots who get ATP certificates each year are doing so at the Restricted ATP (R-ATP) level initially after having qualified for the reduced hours option by training in a collegiate aviation program.

This option first became possible after 2013 and we can see that by 2017 these programs had come fully online in their production of a stable percentage of the pilots who qualify for their subsequent ATP certficaites each year. These pilots are entering into service as airline pilots (First Officers) with less than the full ATP certificate experience requirements of 1500 hours total flight experience.